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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, i Case No. 920342-CA 
v. : 
SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG, : Category No. 2 '' 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated 
assault, a thi rd degree fel ony , i n vi ol atioi 1 of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-103 (1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and 
for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L, Park, 
p r e s I d I n g. T h i s C o u r t: h a s j u r I s d i c t i o n t o 1 I € • a i: 11 I I s a p p e a ] 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is: 
] , Dn! the trial court abuse its discretl on in denying 
defendant L- motii'ii to dismiss, based on defendant's claim that he 
was not brought 1o trial within 120 days of h is filing a Notice 
and Request for Dispostion of Pending Charges, in violatioii of 
Uta h Code A I n :i § ) 7 -29 ] (1 990), after I t found that defendant's 
requests for continuances constituted "good cause" extend the 
120-day period? ,![L]egal determinations concernir proper 
interpretation of the statute which grants the trial court 
discretion are reviewed for correctness. Similarly, the trial 
court's factual determinations will not be disturbed unless 
clearly erroneous. It is only after these primary determinations 
are made that the record can be reviewed for the existence of a 
reasonable basis for the proposition that good cause existed for 
the continuance or the delay," State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
425 (Utah 1991) (finding that trial courts have authority to use 
their discretion in making determinations concerning the 
existence of "good cause," under section 77-29-1). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules of issues addressed in this brief are: 
Utah Code Ann. (1990) 
77-29-1 Prisoner's demand for disposition of 
pending charge - Duties of custodial officer 
- Continuance may be granted - Dismissal of 
charge for failure to bring to trial 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a 
term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state 
any untried indictment or information, and 
the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or 
any appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the charge 
and the court wherein it is pending and 
requesting disposition of the pending charge, 
he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date 
of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer, upon receipt of the demand described 
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause 
the demand to be forwarded by personal 
delivery or certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to the appropriate prosecuting 
attorney and court clerk. The warden, 
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sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon 
request of the prosecuting attorney so 
notified, provide the attorney with such 
information concerning the term of commitment 
of the demanding prisoner as shall be 
requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as 
required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting 
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for 
good cause shown in open court, with the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not 
brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 12, 1991, defendant, Sioudone Phathmmavong, was 
charged by information with aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), for 
acts committed on or about June 15, 1991 (R. 85).x He was 
arrested on August 5, 1991 (R. 138) and sent to prison on a pre-
revocation hearing information on August 27 (R. 75). 
1
 Resolution of the issue raised in this case largely depends 
on events occurring in the previous, related case of aggravated 
assault, which was dismissed (Information in Case No. 911001115, 
attached as Ex. 1 to defendant's motion to dismiss, R. 85). 
Since defendant has not supplied the record of that case to this 
Court on appeal, the State supplements its references to the 
record by referring to attachments to the various filings made in 
connection with defendant's motion to dismiss, and the memorandum 
decision of the trial court. 
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On September 19, defendant signed a Notice and Request 
for Disposition of Pending Charges ("Notice"), receipt of which 
was acknowledged by June Hinckley, an authorized agent of the 
record unit at the Utah State Prison, on October 8, 1991 (R. 76). 
The Utah County Attorney's Office acknowledged receipt of the 
Notice on October 11, 1991 (R. 74). 
A preliminary hearing was held on October 9, 1991, at 
which time defendant was represented by John Musselman. However, 
the hearing was reset for October 21, 1991 upon the prosecution's 
assertion that defendant's investigator had threatened the 
State's witnesses if they testified (R. 138). On October 21, the 
preliminary hearing resumed with defendant represented by new 
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, who requested a continuance until 
October, 25, 1991, in order to review transcripts of witness 
interviews (R. 137). Following the preliminary hearing on 
October 25, defendant was bound over to the district court (R. 
78). An arraignment, set for November 15, was continued to 
November 22, 1991 because a transportation order had not been 
prepared, at which time trial was set for December 11 (R. 137). 
On December 11, 1991, the parties appeared for trial, 
at which time the prosecutor notified the court that a Mr. Hodge, 
a witness sought by both parties, had finally appeared and was 
available to testify. The witness claimed that he had been 
contacted by defendant's sister through another friend to testify 
falsely (R. 71, 130, 137). Defendant's counsel requested another 
continuance to interview the witness, and trial was continued to 
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January 6, 1992 (R. 137). 
On January 6, the court was ready for trial. The 
prosecution, however, had previously moved to amend the 
information to include a firearm enhancement, which the court 
denied. The prosecution then moved to dismiss the information, 
which motion the court granted (R. 68-69, 97, 136). 
The State had sworn and issued a new information on 
January 13, 1992, which was filed on January 20, again charging 
defendant with aggravated assault, with additional reference in 
the charge to defendant's use of a deadly weapon 
(R. 2). The information also included a firearm enhancement 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (1990), and a second count, 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1990) 
(R. 2). 
On January 22, 1992, defendant appeared for the 
preliminary hearing on the refiled charges with new counsel, Gary 
Weight (R. 6, 9, 136). Mr. Weight moved for a continuance, and 
the preliminary hearing was set for February 18, 1992 (R. 8, 
136). On February 18, the preliminary hearing was held, 
defendant's motion to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of 
his habeas corpus petition was denied, and he was bound over to 
the district court to appear on February 28, 1992 (R. 61, 136). 
At the arraignment, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and 
also waived his right to a speedy trial (R. 62-63, 136). 
On March 4, 1992, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, 
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alleging that he had not been tried within 120 days following the 
delivery of his Notice, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 
(1990) (R. 68-100). The trial court denied the motion on March 
17 (Memorandum Decision, "Decision," R. 133-39, attached at 
Addendum A). 
On March 23, 1992 defendant's case was tried to a jury, 
which found defendant guilty of aggravated assault (R. 208). 
Upon the State's request, Count II, possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, was dismissed (R. 209). Defendant 
was sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison of not more than 
five years to run concurrently with any other sentences he might 
be serving (R. 233-34). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of facts relating to the substance of the 
charges is not necessary to the resolution of the issue raised on 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) provides that a 
defendant serving a term of imprisonment may request disposition 
of an untried charge pending against him within 120 days if he 
delivers a notice to the proper authorities. However, that 
period may be extended for "good cause" if delays are caused by 
the defendant• Utah case law has found good cause where a 
defendant has caused such delays by requesting continuances and 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in extending trial 
in granting such continuances. 
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In this case the trial court found that on three 
separate occasions defendant caused delays by requesting 
continuances. These continuances were uniformly granted to give 
defendant's counsel time to prepare following the discovery of a 
previously unlocatable witness or where defendant's counsel 
needed additional time to prepare because they had just recently 
made their appearance. These continuances were reasonable and 
granted for good cause. Since such continuances reasonably 
extended the statutory period within which defendant had to be 
brought to trial, defendant's argument directed to any additional 
delay resulting from the filing of new charges is irrelevant to 
evaluating the reasonableness of the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE, DISCOUNTING THOSE 
PERIODS IN WHICH DEFENDANT CAUSED THE DELAY, 
TRIAL WAS HELD WITHIN 120 DAYS OF THE 
DELIVERY OF THE NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR 
DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss, a motion based on his allegation that he was 
not brought to trial within 120 days of the date of the delivery 
of his Notice, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a 
term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state 
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any untried indictment or information, and 
the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or 
any appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the charge 
and the court wherein it is pending and 
requesting disposition of the pending charge, 
he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date 
of delivery of written notice. 
(4) In the event the charge is not 
brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
"[L]egal determinations concerning the proper 
interpretation of the statute which grants the trial court 
discretion are reviewed for correctness. Similarly, the trial 
court's factual determinations will not be disturbed unless 
clearly erroneous. It is only after these primary determinations 
are made that the record can be reviewed for the existence of a 
reasonable basis for the proposition that good cause existed for 
the continuance or the delay." State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
425 (Utah 1991) (finding that trial courts have authority to use 
their discretion in making determinations concerning the 
existence of "good cause," under section 77-29-1). 
The trial court found that a total of 164 days elapsed 
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from October 20, 199l,2 the date on which defendant gave Notice 
to the Utah County Attorney, to March 23, 1992, the date of trial 
(Decision, par, 7, R. 134). However, the trial court also found 
that defendant himself had caused delays which tolled the running 
of the 120-day period so that defendant was, in fact, brought to 
trial within the statutorily required period (Decision, par. 8, 
R. 134). In support, the trial court cited State v. Velasquez, 
641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982), and State v. Bonnv, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 
P.2d 147 (1970). 
In Velasquez, trial was held 119 days after the 
defendant had filed his notice of request for disposition of 
pending charges. However, the trial was postponed 42 days in 
response to the defendant's request for a continuance. Analyzing 
the defendant's challenge under Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953 as 
amended),3 the supreme court rejected the claim, stating: 
2
 October "20," 1991 is evidently a typographical error, 
since no procedural event of record took place on that date. 
Instead, the trial court's counting of 164 days back from the 
trial date indicates the court's intention to use October 11, 
1991, the date of actual delivery of the notice to the Utah 
County Attorney, as the date from which the 120-day period should 
begin (Return Receipt from Utah County Attorney, R. 74). 
3
 Section 77-65-1 was replaced by section 77-29-1, 
effective July 1, 1980, a date following the filing of the 
defendant's notice, but prior to the trial date. Since the trial 
occurred 119 days after the delivery of the notice, defendant had 
no claim under section 77-29-1, which provides for a 120-day 
period within which a defendant must be tried following the 
delivery of the notice. See section 77-29-1. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-65-1 (1953 as amended) provided: 
(l)(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a 
term of imprisonment in a penal or 
correctional institution of this state, and 
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The 42-day postponement caused by 
defendant cannot reasonably be included 
within the 90-day period prescribed by 
77-65-1. The obvious purpose of this statute 
is to protect the constitutional right of 
prisoners to a speedy trial and "to prevent 
those charged with enforcement of criminal 
statutes from holding over the head of a 
prisoner undisposed of charges against him." 
When the prisoner himself acts to delay trial 
on such charges, he indicates his willingness 
whenever during the continuance of the term 
of imprisonment there is pending in this 
state any untried indictment, information or 
complaint against the prisoner, he shall be 
brought to trial within ninety days after he 
shall have caused to be delivered to the 
county attorney of the county in which the 
indictment, information or complaint is 
pending and the appropriate court written 
notice of the place of his imprisonment and 
his request for a final disposition to be 
made of the indictment, information or 
complaint: provided, that for a good cause 
shown in open court, the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(b) The written notice and request for 
final disposition referred to in paragraph 
(a) hereof shall be given or sent by the 
prisoner to the warden, sheriff or other 
official having custody of him, who shall 
promptly forward it together with the 
certificate to the appropriate county 
attorney and court by registered or certified 
mail, return receipt requested. 
(2) In the event that the action is not 
brought to trial within the period of time as 
herein provided, no court of this state shall 
any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor 
shall the untried indictment, information or 
complaint be of any further force or effect, 
and the court shall enter an order dismissing 
the same with prejudice. 
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to temporarily waive this protection; the 
purpose behind the statute thus no longer 
exists. A reasonable interpretation of 
77-65-1 requires that the original 90-dav 
disposition period be extended by the amount 
of time during which defendant himself has 
created delay. 
Id, at 116 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In consequence 
of the defendant himself being responsible for the delay, the 
supreme court concluded that the 42-day period for which the 
defendant was responsible should be added to the statutory 90-day 
period in order to determine the proper period within which trial 
should have been held. JEd. at 117. 
In Bonny, the prosecutor suggested at the arraignment a 
trial date within 90 days of the delivery of the defendant's 
notice and request for disposition. However, the defendant's 
counsel insisted that he could not make the suggested date, 
whereupon the trial court suggested another date, five days 
beyond the 90 days prescribed by section 77-65-1, which the 
defendant's counsel accepted. At the beginning of trial the 
defendant made a motion to dismiss based on the violation of the 
statute, which motion was denied. The supreme court upheld the 
trial court's ruling, finding, in effect, that the extension 
beyond the 90-day period was a continuance "for good cause 
shown," made at the defendant's request, and therefore, an 
exception to the 90-day requirement of the statute. JTd. at 25 
Utah 2d at 118-19, 477 P.2d at 148. 
The facts of this case place it squarely within the 
holdings of Velasquez and Bonny. The trial court identified 
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three separate periods in which continuances were granted at 
defendant's request: 
The Court in the review of the record 
finds that the defendant's counsel made a 
motion for continuance on October 21, 1991 
and that the preliminary hearing was 
continued from October 21, 1991 to October 
25, 1991, a total of four days. The Court 
further finds that on December 11, 1991, 
defendant requested a continuance of the 
trial to interview a newly discovered witness 
and that the trial was continued to January 
6, 1992, a total of 26 days. The Court 
further finds that on January 22, 1992 
counsel for the defendant requested a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing and 
the preliminary hearing was continued to 
February 18, 1992 for a total of 27 days. 
The Court finds that pursuant to the 
defendant's request for continuance, the 
matter has been continued for a total of 57 
days. 
(Decision, par. 6, R. 133). 
The trial court found that it was undisputed by the 
parties that the first continuance was granted for the purpose of 
allowing defendant's new counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, the opportunity 
to review certain transcripts (Decision, par. 2 at 137). The 
record further supports the view that at least the second 
referenced continuance was not only granted as a courtesy to 
allow defendant to further prepare for the appearance of another 
witness, but was really occasioned by defendant's wrongful 
intrusions into the criminal investigation of the case (State's 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R. 130, stating that 
the newly discovered witness had been asked by defendant's sister 
through another friend to testify falsely; Minute Entry - Trial 
Rescheduled, R. 70-71). In fact, defendant concedes that "the 
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introduction of a witness at the last minute may not necessarily 
be a maneuver by the State to delay the trial . . ." (Appellant's 
Brief at 18). 
Furthermore, the record supports the prosecution's 
claim, referenced by the trial court in its ruling, that at least 
defendant's third continuance was granted to allow defendant's 
newly appointed counsel to prepare for the preliminary hearing in 
this case. That continuance was obviously reasonable since 
defendant's new counsel, Gary Weight, had just made his 
appearance on the very day the preliminary hearing was scheduled 
(State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R. 129; 
Decision, par. 5, R. 135; Minute Entry - Notice of Continuance, 
R. 8; Notice of Appearance of Counsel, R. 9). It is obvious that 
the refiling of charges had nothing to do with this request for 
continuance since those charges had been sworn to and issued on 
January 13, 1992, nine days before defendant's new counsel even 
made his appearance (Decision, par. 2 at 136). 
In support of its denial of defendant's motion to 
dismiss, the trial court concluded: 
The Court concluding that on March 23, 
1992 there will have elapsed 164 days from 
the date of defendant's demand. The Court 
concluding that 57 of those days were due to 
defendant's requests for continuances. The 
Court in conformity with the Valesquez [sic] 
decision should add the 57 days to the 120 
days, for a total of 177 days. The Trial 
setting of March 23, 1992 is well within the 
total of 177 days. 
13 
(Decision, par. 8, R. 134)/ Since there were obviously 
As noted above, the trial court effectively used October 
11, 1991, the date on which the Utah County Attorney received the 
Notice, as the date from which the statutory period should be 
counted, i.e. 164 days (Appellee's Brief at 9 n.2). The court, 
however, found that the period should be extended to 177 days. 
Therefore, trial effectively took place within the period by 13 
days. 
While defendant has not expressly challenged this 
accounting, he argues that September 19, 1991, the date on which 
he allegedly delivered the Notice to a Lynette Vance, a prison 
case worker, is the date from which to begin calculating the 
period. Indeed, there is in the record an affidavit from a 
Lynette Vance, attesting to her having received the Notice and 
her authority to accept and receive such notices from prisoners 
(Affidavit of Lynette Vance, R. 147-48). 
Defendant, however, has clearly waived any argument based 
on a claim that the relevant period should commence on September 
19. First, defendant's motion to dismiss consistently argued 
for, and made calculations in support of his argument based on, 
October 11, 1991, as the relevant date (Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss at 10-12, R. 89-91). Defendant supported his argument 
only with the Notice itself (Notice, R. 76). Second, defendant, 
through a simultaneously filed request, moved the trial court to 
expeditiously render a ruling on his motion since trial was then 
set to begin only one week later (Request for Decision, R. 112-
13). In accordance with defendant's request, the trial court 
responded the following day with its Decision, having then also 
considered the State's response and defendant's reply (Decision, 
R. 133-39). Thus, in deciding the issue, the trial court never 
had before it either a legal argument or supporting evidence that 
would suggest that the relevant date from which the period should 
run was September 19, 1991. Only two days later, on March 19, 
did defendant file the affidavit. There is nothing of record 
that suggests that defendant asked the trial court to reconsider 
the matter based on this additional theory, and he thereby waived 
his claim based on such theory. See State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 
53 (Utah 1981) (holding that where the defendant did not assert 
the illegality of a warrantless seizure of stolen property in his 
motion to suppress in the trial court and the trial court did not 
address the issue, the issue could not be raised for the first 
time on appeal). 
Even if this Court were to compute the statutory period 
beginning September 19, 1991, it would find such additional time 
offset by periods of delay caused by defendant which the trial 
court did not compute in its Decision. First, the preliminary 
hearing in the original case was continued from October 9, 1991 
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reasonable grounds for finding that defendant had caused the 
delays, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
good cause for extending the statutory period beyond the time in 
which trial took place, and thereby properly denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss* 
Defendant correctly notes that in Petersen, the supreme 
court reaffirmed its position, stated in State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 
2d 361, 363, 453 P.2d 158, 160 (1969), that the burden of 
complying with section 77-29-1 lies with the prosecution. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424. However, the court in Petersen then 
to October 21, 1991, a period of 11 days, because defendant, 
through his family and investigator had intimidated the State's 
witnesses to the point that they were unwilling to testify 
(State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R. 131; 
Decision, par. 2 at 138). Second, defendant waived his right to 
a speedy trial at his arraignment on February 28, 1992, 23 days 
before trial was to begin (Minute Entry - Arraignment/Jury Trial 
Set, R. 63). 
The State considers the correct date from which the 
statute should run is October 8, 1991, the date on which June 
Hinckley, an authorized agent of the Record Unit of the Utah 
State Prison, signed and thereby acknowledged receipt of the 
Notice from defendant (Notice, R. 29). Such construction is 
clearly supported by the plain language of section 77-29-1(1), 
which provides that the period shall run from delivery of the 
notice to "any appropriate agent" of the warden. In this regard 
the trial court's confusion is understandable since the Utah 
Supreme Court evidently made the same mistake in making the same 
calculation under section 77-29-1(1). See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 
424, 426 n.25 (finding it impossible to determine the date from 
which the statutory period ran because the record did not reveal 
when the notice was delivered to the county attorney, even though 
the court had already recited the date on which the notice, as 
per the statute, was delivered to the warden). Calculating from 
October 8, the period to date of trial would be 167 days. 
Therefore, trial actually took place within the period by 10 
days. 
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proceeded to analyze the defendant's challenge in accord with 
section 77-29-1(4), noting particularly that the question of 
dismissal turned on whether the prosecution could demonstrate 
"good cause" for the delay, ultimately finding that the showing 
had not been made. Id. at 426-27. Furthermore, the court 
recognized that upon a finding of "good cause," the statute 
tolled the running of the time within which a defendant must be 
tried, thus reaffirming the procedure it had announced in 
Velascmez. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425-26, 426 n.21. 
In Petersen, the defendant filed a notice and request 
for disposition. At his arraignment, 57 days later, he requested 
that the trial court appoint different counsel because of his 
dissatisfaction with the public defender's handling of his case. 
The trial court denied his request and then set a trial date 218 
days from the delivery of notice and request for disposition, and 
161 days following its discovery of the problem, in order to 
allow defendant and his appointed counsel to resolve their 
differences. The supreme court reversed the defendant's 
conviction, holding that the trial court had abused its 
discretion in extending trial for such an inordinate period. In 
particular, the court found the trial court implicitly denied the 
need for such an extension by its subsequent refusal to continue 
the matter when the defendant's counsel moved to withdraw 34 days 
before trial because the same difficulties continued. 
In this case the trial court clearly did not abuse its 
discretion as the trial court did in Petersen. In Petersen, the 
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trial court itself allowed an inordinate amount of time to 
resolve a conflict, beyond that allowed by section 77-29-1, and 
then effectively acknowledged that such period was excessive by 
refusing to continue the trial, due to begin within a much 
shorter period, when the same difficulties still persisted. In 
contradistinction, the trial court in this case granted 
reasonable continuances in response to defendant's requests, 
creating delays for which defendant was exclusively responsible. 
Defendant's principal argument, however, that he was 
not brought to trial within the statutorily required period, is 
based on the prosecution's refiling of charges, the substance of 
which he claims were known to the prosecution long in advance of 
the date on which they were filed, and were thus brought to delay 
the proceedings (Appellant's Brief at Points I, II and III). In 
support, defendant cites Petersen, and particularly State v. 
Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974), where the supreme court held 
that the prosecution could not thwart the 90-day mandate of 
section 77-65-1 by refiling identical charges. 
Defendant's resort to this claim, while arguably 
relevant in a close case, only highlights his failure to address 
the real issue presented in this case, i.e., whether the delays 
he created were proper grounds for extending the running of the 
120-day period. Defendant barely addresses this primary issue, 
entirely failing to marshal any evidence in support of the trial 
court's ruling or to challenge its legal basis. Furthermore, 
assuming the reasonableness of the factual and legal bases for 
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the trial court's ruling, defendant's reliance on delays created 
by the refiling of charges is entirely misplaced. In Moore, the 
defendant was not tried within the statutory period exclusively 
because the prosecution extended the matter by refiling identical 
charges. In this case, entirely apart from whether the matter 
was also extended by the prosecution's refiling of charges, the 
trial court found additional delays for which defendant was 
responsible, which brought his trial within the statutory period. 
Because these delays clearly justify the extension of the 
statutory period, arguments relating to the refiling of charges 
are simply superfluous to a resolution of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and his 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <"? day of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
-KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^W 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Number: 921400082 
Date: March 17, 1992 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
********** 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion 
To Dismiss. 
The Court having read the Defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Response To Defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss and the Defendant's Reply To Plaintiff's Response To 
Motion To Dismiss, and having reviewed the file and being fully 
informed on the premises makes the following findings and 
conclusions: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The Defendant is charged in an Information filed 
February 20, 1992 with Ct. I: Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony alleged to have occurred on or about June 14, 
1991, in Utah County, Utah. Ct. II: Possession Of A Dangerous 
Weapon By A Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony alleged to 
have occurred on or about June 14 , 1991, in Utah County, Utah. 
Notice is further given in the Information that if a firearm or 
a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court may 
additionally enhance the sentence of the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG, 
Defendant. 
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2. The following calendar of events are undisputed 
between the parties: 
PATE; 
June 14/15, 1991 
July 12, 1991 
August 5, 1991 
August 27, 1991 
September 5, 1991 
September 19, 1991 
October 8f 1991 
October 9, 1991 
QCCUlRRANgg: 
The alleged incident involving the 
defendant occurred. 
State of Utah filed an Information. 
The defendant was apprehended and 
arrested. 
The Defendant was sent to prison on a 
pre-revocation hearing Information. 
The Defendant attended a waiver 
hearing. 
The Defendant signed a Notice and 
Request For Disposition Pending 
Charges. (Exhibit 5 to Defendant's 
Motion To Dismiss.) 
Receipt of a Notice And Request For 
Disposition Of Pending Charges by the 
Authorized Agent at the Utah State 
Prison. (Exhibit 5 to Defendant's 
Motion To Dismiss.) 
A preliminary hearing was heard in the 
Circuit Court. Allegations were made 
that the witnesses had been threatened 
with retaliation by the defendant or 
members of the defendant's family. 
Witness Amy Sumner was subpoenaed, 
appeared and indicated that because of 
threats she did not want to testify. 
Subpoenaed Chad Grigalda did not 
appear. Counsel for the plaintiff. 
State of Utah, and defense attorney 
John Musselman met with Judge Dimick 
in chambers to allow the State to 
continue with the preliminary hearing 
to question one Raymond Bray, the 
investigator hired by the defendant. 
Raymond Bray was placed under oath and 
refused to answer questions involving 
his actions regarding the witnesses 
and his investigation by invoking the 
fifth amendment privilege. The 
preliminary hearing was reset to 
October 21, 1991. A oo 
JLOO 
October 11, 1991 
October 21, 1991 
October 25, 1991 
November 15# 1991 
November 22, 1991 
December 11, 1991 
Defendant's Notice And Request For 
Disposition Of Pending Charges was 
received by the Utah County Attorney's 
Office. (Exhibit 7 to Defendant's 
Motion To Dismiss.) 
Preliminary hearing resumed with the 
defendant and new counsel for the 
defendant Jimi Mitsunaga. Counsel for 
the defendant requested that the 
preliminary hearing be continued so 
that he could review the transcripts 
of the interviews of witnesses done by 
Officer Larsen. Preliminary hearing 
continued to October 25, 1991. 
Preliminary hearing continued, Circuit 
Court bound the defendant over to 
District Court. 
Arraignment in District Court. A 
Transportation Order was not prepared, 
the defendant was not present. 
Arraignment continued to November 22, 
1991. 
Defendant arraigned. Trial set for 
December 11, 1991 before Judge 
Christensen. 
Parties appeared for trial, jury 
called, plaintiff indicated to the 
Court and to defense counsel that a 
witness, Mr. Hodge, had just been 
discovered and was present in court 
and ready to testify. Counsel for the 
defendant moved to continued the trial 
to interview the recently discovered 
witness. John Hodge, the recently 
discovered witness, had indicated that 
he had been contacted by defendant's 
sister and through another friend and 
had been requested to testify falsely 
regarding the defendant's case. 
Defendant's counsel requested a 
continuance in order to interview Mr. 
John Hodge. The Court continued the 
trial to January 6, 1992. 
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January 6, 1992 
January 13, 1992 
January 22, 1992 
Court was ready for trial, the jury 
was called, and plaintiff had 
previously filed a Motion To Amend The 
Information based on additional 
information from newly discovered 
witnesses. The Court denied the 
State's Motion To Amend The 
Information, and plaintiff moved to 
dismiss the Information against the 
defendant. The defendant objected to 
the Motion To Dismiss. The Court 
granted the Motion To Dismiss. 
A new Information was sworn to and 
issued by the Circuit Court involving 
the State of Utah vs. the defendant 
herein. This Information is the 
subject matter of the current 
lawsuit. Defendant appeared for a 
first felony appearance on this date. 
Defendant appeared with new counsel, 
Gary Weight, for preliminary hearing. 
Mr. Weight moved for a continuance of 
the preliminary hearing. Court 
granted the defendant's motion to 
continue and the preliminary hearing 
was set for February 18, 1992. 
Preliminary hearing was held. 
Defendant filed a Motion To Stay 
Proceedings pending the outcome of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Court denied 
this motion and bound the defendant 
over to the District Court to appear 
on February 28, 1992. 
Defendant appeared with Mr. 
Gary Weight for arraignment. 
Defendant pled not guilty and the 
court set a trial date for March 23, 
1992. 
3. Defendant filed on March 4, 1992 a Motion To 
Dismiss alleging that under 77-29-1 U.C.A., the defendant had 
given appropriate notice of demand for disposition of pending 
charges within 120 days. The defendant has not been tried 
within 120 days from the date of the demand, which would be 
either October 8, 1991, the date the said demand was 
February 18, 1992 
February 28, 1992 
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received by the authorized agent at the Utah State Prison or 
October 11, 1991, the date that Utah County Attorney received 
notice of defendant's demand. 
4. Defendant further alleged that his rights have been 
violated pursuant to statute and that February 8, 1992 is the 
very latest date that the State could have appropriately tried 
the defendant. That the Utah County Attorney's Office actually 
received notice on the 11th of October, 1991 and 120 days added 
thereto would be February 8, 1992. Defendant further alleges 
that there is no good cause why the defendant could not have 
been tried within the 120 days and therefor the court is 
mandated to dismiss the action against the defendant. 
5. Plaintiff has further alleged that defendant's 
continual changing of counsel, request for continuances, and 
the defendant's frustration of the plaintiff's case by threats 
having been made to witnesses through defendant's family, 
friends and/or investigator has delayed bringing the case to 
trial. Plaintiff contends that there is good cause shown and 
that the Court should not grant the defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss. 
6. The Court in the review of the record finds that 
the defendant's counsel made a motion for continuance on 
October 21, 1991 and that the preliminary hearing was continued 
from October 21, 1991 to October 25, 1991, a total of four 
days. The Court further finds that on December 11, 
1991,defendant requested a continuance of the trial to 
interview a newly discovered witness and that the trial was 
continued to January 6, 1992, a total of 26 days. The Court 
further finds that on January 22, 1992 counsel for the 
defendant requested a continuance of the preliminary hearing 
and the preliminary hearing was continued to February 18, 1992 
for a total of 27 days. The Court finds that pursuant to the 
defendant's request for continuance, the matter has been 
continued for a total of 57 days. 
7. The Court concludes that from October 20, 1991 
through March 23, 1992, (the date set for trial in this matter) 
that there would be a total of 164 days elapse since the 
defendant gave notice to the Utah County Attorney of his demand 
for disposition of pending charges. The Court relies upon 
State of Utah v. Valesquez, 641 P2d 115 (Jan. 8, 1982). In 
that case Justice Hall concluded, "The 42 day postponement 
caused by defendant cannot reasonably be included within the 90 
day period prescribed by 77-65-1. (Predecessor to 77-29-1 
U.C.A.) The obvious purpose of this statute is to protect the 
constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to 
/prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal statutes 
from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed of charges 
against him.' (State v. Wilson, 22 UT2d 361, 453 P2d 158) 
When the prisoner himself acts to delay trial on such charges, 
he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive this 
protection; the purpose behind the statute does no longer 
exist. (State v. Bonnie, 25 UT2d 117, 477 P2d 147) A 
reasonable interpretation 77-65-1 U.C.A. requires that the 
original 90 day disposition period be extended by the amount of 
time during which the defendant himself has created delay." 
The Valesquez decision has been followed in the following Utah 
cases, State v. Banner, 717 P2d 1325, 1329 and State v. Ossana, 
747 P2d 440, 433. 
8. The Court concluding that on March 23, 1992 there 
will have elapsed 164 days from the date of the defendant's 
demand. The Court concluding that 57 of those days were due to 
defendant's requests for continuances. The Court in conformity 
with the Valesquez decision should add the 57 days to the 120 
days, for a total of 177 days. The Trial setting of March 23, 
1992 is well within the total of 177 days. 
9. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is denied. 
10. Counsel for the plaintiff is directed to prepare 
and serve on counsel for defendant appropriate Findings, 
Conclusions and Order in accordance with the foregoing, and 
then submit such documents to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, UT this 17th>d*¥^of March, 1992. 
HJRT^"" ~^t 
PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Sherry Ragan 
Gary Weight 
